Introduction
Much of the economics literature on rewards and incentives focuses on the problem of designing compensation schemes in di¤erent environments. A rich literature shows how, for example, the employee's risk aversion, the extent to which output is veri…able, the existence of multiple tasks, or the presence of team production, should a¤ect compensation schemes. The existing economics literature pays relatively little attention to how an employee's performance is measured. Generally, it is taken for granted that some (imperfect) measures of performance are available. In practice, it is often the case that employees receive annual performance evaluations from their supervisors. These evaluations usually form the basis for setting bonuses or promotions.
There is a diverse business literature on performance evaluations. One strand in this literature examines what kind of evaluations supervisors give. One wellknown …nding is that many supervisors tend to give (too) positive assessments. 2 This phenomenon is known as the leniency bias. Another …nding is that some managers tend to compress performance ratings. 3 This is known as the centrality show that the credibility of the supervisor a¤ects the sign and the size of the e¤ect of negative feedback on an employee's future performance. More generally, there is ample evidence that employees tend to reject feedback that is inconsistent with their own beliefs. 4 The main objective of this paper is to develop a model that explains the two biases in performance ratings, and at the same time explains how performance appraisals a¤ect employees'future performances. Although this paper does not address the problem of the design of an optimal incentives scheme, it does illustrate that a better understanding in the performance appraisal process is likely to contribute to a better understanding of the working of incentive schemes.
The model we develop has four key characteristics. First, at the beginning of the game, both the supervisor and the employee form a perception of the employee's past performance. We model this formation of perceptions by assuming that the two agents receive private signals. 5 Second, we assume that supervisors di¤er in their abilities to assess the employee's performance correctly. The motivation of this assumption is that supervisors have been found to vary in their beliefs about their skills to appraise their subordinates [see, for example, Napier and Latham (1986),
and Tziner et al. (2001)]. Third, we assume an environment where employees are rewarded on the basis of their performance evaluations. So, appraisals are linked to rewards. 6 Finally, the employee's ability and his e¤ort are complements. The implication of this last characteristic is that the more the employee is con…dent about his ability, the more e¤ort he exerts.
We derive several results. Our …rst set of results pertains to a situation where the employee knows his own ability. In this extreme situation, performance appraisals only provide information about the supervisor's ability to assess the employee's ability correctly. A supervisor who gives an incorrect assessment of an employee's performance loses credibility. A direct implication is that a supervisor who knows an employee's performance has no incentive to rate it incorrectly. This would only damage his credibility. The employee would doubt whether his future performance would be correctly assessed. For a supervisor who does not observe an employee's performance three forces are at work. First, she has an incentive to give an appraisal that is most likely to be consistent with the employee's perception. This force may 5 In our model, the assumption that the employee receives a signal about his performance amounts to assuming that the employee has imperfect knowledge about his own abilities. The psychological literature o¤ers a huge body of evidence that this assumption is valid (see, among others, Sedikes and Strube, 1995; Klar et al., 1996; Baumeister, 1998; Kruger, 1999; and Ackerman et al., 2002) . 6 This means that we assume that the supervisor is able to commit herself to a compensation scheme based on subjective performance evaluations. In a situation where the supervisor is the residual claimer, this assumption is strong, as ex post she will have an incentive to pretend that the employee did a poor job. However, in many situations supervisors are not residual claimers.
explain the centrality bias of performance evaluations. Second, as the employee's ability and his e¤ort are complements, it is more important for the supervisor that her evaluation is correct in case the employee is more able. This force leads to a positive bias in performance appraisals. Finally, a less able supervisor wants to come across as able. This gives her an incentive to give an appraisal that able supervisors relatively frequently give. We show that this force tends to dampen the total e¤ect of the …rst two forces.
The second set of results are derived from the version of the model in which we relax the assumption that the employee knows his own ability and thereby his past performance. In this setting, apart from the incentives discussed above, a supervisor has an incentive to give positive appraisals. The reason for this incentive is that the employee's e¤ort is an increasing function of his belief about his ability. This result explains the leniency bias often found in the empirical literature on performance rating. The idea that supervisors give positive appraisals to boost employees' perceptions of their abilities to make them work harder is not novel. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) , for instance, show that giving a challenging task to an employee signals con…dence and thereby motivates. New is that simple cheap-talk messages may motivate employees.
7 Essential in our model is that apart from boosting an employee's con…dence, the supervisor wants to show that she is capable of assessing the employee's performance. This weakens her incentive to give positive appraisals when the employee is perceived to perform poorly. If either the supervisor were always capable of assessing the employees'performance correctly or the employee had absolutely no clue about his ability, the supervisor's incentive to come across as able would vanish. In such a situation, she would always provide positive feedback. As a result, feedback would contain no information about an employee's actual performance.
Apart from the business literature on performance appraisals, this paper is most closely related to the literature on subjective performance appraisals [important early papers are Bull (1987) and Gibbs et al. (1994) ; see Prendergast (1999) and Bol (2009) for reviews of the literature]. Key notion in this literature is that most people 7 Crutzen, Swank and Visser (2007) show that comparative cheap-talk messages may reveal meaningful information about employees'performance levels. However, they also show that supervisors tend to abstain from di¤erentiating among employees.
do not work in jobs where all aspects of an employee's performance are veri…able.
Repeated interaction may allow for an implicit contract in which rewards are based on unveri…able information. In practice, the problem with incentive contracts is not only that an employee's performance is not veri…able for a third party. Often, it is di¢ cult to assess an employee's performance in the …rst place. Then, measuring performance requires expertise. Moreover, disagreement about the true performance may exist. Our paper does not focus on the determination of the optimal contract in these situations. Rather, it tries to shed light on the communication between supervisors and employees given a speci…c incentive scheme. We believe that this approach makes sense, because the persons who are responsible for performance appraisals do not always have a say in the design of the compensation scheme. This paper is also related to Prendergast (1993) who shows that when …rms use subjective performance evaluations an employee may have an incentive to conform to the opinion of his supervisor. In our model, however, it is the supervisor who has an incentive to guess the worker's opinion about his performance. By guessing correctly, the supervisor signals that she can assess the worker's future performance accurately.
Finally our paper is related to Prendergast and Topel (1993, 1996) , who also start from the premise that a manager's appraisal is not fully trustworthy. In their model, the performance appraisal may deviate from the true performance because the manager is biased with respect to the employee. In our model, any deviation of the performance appraisal from the true performance level is because the manager lacks the necessary expertise to judge the worker's performance.
The Feedback Model
Our model describes the interaction between a worker (he) and his supervisor, the manager (she). The worker faces two kinds of uncertainties. First, he is uncertain about how his e¤ort a¤ects his performance, and second, he is uncertain about the manager's ability to assess his performance correctly. The worker chooses e¤ort, e, to produce output y. The extent to which e¤ort translates into output depends on the worker's ability, a: speci…cally y = ae. There are two types of workers, a 2 fl; hg. The prior probability that the worker is of the high ability type equals : Pr (a = h) = and Pr (a = l) = (1 ). The worker does not know his type.
However, he receives a private signal about a, s 2 fl; hg. With probability , the worker's signal is fully informative, s = a. With probability (1 ), s does not contain any information about a. Denote by the probability that the worker believes that a = h after he has received signal s = h : = Pr (a = hjs = h) = +
(1 ) and 1 = Pr (a = ljs = h). Likewise denote by the probability that the worker believes that a = l after he has received signal a = l : = Pr (a = ljs = l) = + (1 ) (1 ) and 1 = Pr (a = hjs = l).
There are two types of managers: t = fb; gg, with Pr (t = g) = .
A good manager, t = g, observes both a and y. A bad manager, t = b, observes neither a nor y. The manager knows her type, but the worker does not know the manager's type. The manager takes two actions. First, before the agent chooses e¤ort, the manager sends a message, m 2 fl; hg, about her perception of the worker's ability.
We assume a natural language in the sense that by sending m = l the manager does not decrease the probability that the worker believes that a = l, while by sending m = h the manager does not decrease the probability that the worker believes that a = h. Let^ (s; m) denote the probability that the worker believes a = h, conditional on s and m. The assumption of a natural language implies that (s; h) ^ (s; l). We sometimes refer to the probability^ (s; m) as the worker's self-con…dence. Second, after the worker has chosen e¤ort, the manager assesses the output that the worker has produced. The key feature of our model is that the manager's feedback may contain information both about the worker's ability and about her own ability to assess the worker's performance correctly.
The worker's payo¤ equals y 
y is the worker's expected output, conditional on the information a bad manager possesses. A crucial assumption is thatŷ is independent of the e¤ort actually exerted by the worker, whereas y is increasing in e¤ort. The manager is assumed to aim at maximizing the (expected) output the worker produces.
The timing of the game is as follows.
Nature draws a and t. The manager observes t. A good manager also observes a.
The worker receives a signal, s, about a.
The manager sends a message, m, to the worker about a.
The worker updates his beliefs about a and t.
The worker chooses e¤ort, e, leading to output y = ae A good manager observes y and pays the worker y. A bad manager does not observe y and pays the workerŷ.
Payo¤s are realized.
All priors are common knowledge, as is the probability . In our model, m is cheap talk. It is well-known that in models with cheap talk, babbling may occur. Throughout, our focus will be on equilibria without babbling.
Let us …nish this section with three comments. First, an important assumption underlying our model is that the manager's ability to observe a is perfectly correlated with her ability to observe y (and so the ability to base the worker's reward on y).
We could have avoided this assumption by adding a probation period to the model.
If at the end of the probation period, only good managers were able to assess output and to infer ability, we would have a similar model as described above. Second, we assume that the manager is committed to reward the worker on the basis of the output that has been produced. This is somewhat restrictive when the manager is a residual claimant. Whenever the manager is not a residual claimant, say the typical middle manager, we expect that she has few, if any, material incentives to avoid paying his worker the proper performance wage. Third, to drive home our results with respect to how the manager's feedback in ‡uences the worker's motivation in the simplest way, we have assumed a very simple production structure.
Equilibria 3.1 The worker knows his own ability: = 1
We start the analysis with examining the case that the worker knows his own ability, = 1 (implying = = 1). In the resulting game, the worker tries to infer information about the manager's type, and the manager tries to convince the worker that she is good. 
where^ (h; m) = 1 and^ (l; m) = 0; because = 1 . Equation (1) shows that the worker's e¤ort is an increasing function of the posterior that the manager is good.
Equation (1) implies that the manager wants the worker to believe that he can correctly assess the worker's ability. The assumption of a natural language implies that it is a dominant strategy for a good manager to reveal her perception of the worker, g (h) = 1 and g (l) = 0. Given the equilibrium strategy of a good manager, Bayes'rule implies the following posterior beliefs
The posteriors show that guessing incorrectly ruins a manager's reputation, while guessing correctly improves it. The extent to which a correct message improves the manager's reputation depends on the probability with which a dumb manager sends that message. For instance, if a dumb manager rarely sends m = l ( b close to 1),
; b is close to 1. More in particular, the higher is b , the lower iŝ h; h; g (a) ; b and the higher is^ l; l; g (a) ; b : Note that if the manager is more likely to be competent, the strategy of a bad manager ( b ) is less important.
Having established how much e¤ort the worker exerts in equilibrium, the dominant strategy of a t = g manager, and the posteriors, there remains to determine the optimal response of a bad manager. Using (1) and the posteriors, it is easy to see that always choosing m = l ( b = 0) is an optimal response of a bad manager if
The left-hand side of (3) So, relative to m = l, m = h boosts the worker's con…dence in the manager. We 8 In the special case where b = 0 and b = 1,^ l; h; g (a) ; b and^ h; l; g (a) ; b , respectively are o¤ the equilibrium path. We assume that, also in this case, the 'wrong' feedback message is attributed to a Bad manager rather than to a Good manager. 9 Recall that e(h; l) = 0 refer to this e¤ect as the con…dence in manager. Second, a high ability worker is more productive than a low ability worker. As a result, it is more productive to guess correctly if the worker is of the high ability type than if he is of the low ability type. This gives an incentive to a t = b manager to send m = h. We call this the productivity e¤ect. The only reason of a bad manager for sending m = l is that it leads to a higher probability of being correct. We call this the playing the odds e¤ect. The playing the odds e¤ect works in favor of giving feedback to the most common worker type:
and m = l if < .
Given (1), always sending m = h ( b = 1) is an optimal response of a bad manager if
The left-hand side of (4) 
One can check that b is increasing in h and decreasing in l. These comparative static results re ‡ect the productivity e¤ect. The bene…t of guessing right is higher if the worker is of the high ability type than if the worker is of the low ability type.
Moreover, b is increasing in . This is the playing the odds e¤ect. The higher is the probability that the worker is of the higher ability type, the higher is the probability that by sending m = h a bad manager guesses correctly. Finally, b is increasing in if and only if >
The next proposition summarizes the discussion above.
Proposition 1 Suppose that in the feedback model = 1 and 2 (0; 1). Then, on the basis of the t = b manager's strategy three equilibria can be distinguished:
2 , an equilibrium in pure strategies exists in which b = 0;
, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists in which b = 1
an equilibrium exists in which b is given by (5).
In equilibria (i iii), the worker's e¤ort is given by (1), the t = g manager's strategy is g (h) = 1 and g (l) = 0, and the posteriors are given by (2) . The equilibrium probability with which a t = b manager chooses m = h is non-increasing in l, and non-decreasing in h and .
The Worker Does Not Know His Ability, = 0
In case the worker's signal does not contain any information about his ability, the worker is not able to infer information about the manager's type from her feedback.
Of course, in equilibrium the manager anticipates this. The main implication is that the manager needs not to consider how her feedback impacts on the worker's perception of her type. To put it di¤erently, if = 0, the con…dence in manager e¤ect, the playing the odds e¤ect and the productivity e¤ect do not longer play a role.
Potentially, there is a new e¤ect of feedback, however. If < 1, the manager has private information about the worker's ability. Consequently, feedback may a¤ect the worker's perception of his ability. We call this the self-con…dence e¤ect. We now argue that if = 0, in equilibrium, a manager always gives positive feedback:
Recall that the manager gives feedback with an eye to encouraging the worker to expend more e¤ort. Our assumption of a natural language implies that providing negative feedback never induces a worker to have a more positive perception of his ability than positive feedback. As e¤ort is increasing in the worker's belief about his ability, it is never optimal for the manager to send negative feedback. Of course, in equilibrium, the worker sees through the manager's attempt to boost his perception of his ability. As a result, the manager's positive feedback has no e¤ect.
Proposition 2 Suppose that in the feedback model = 0. Then, the unique equilibrium is a pooling one in which:
(ii) the worker's e¤ort is given by (1) So far, we have distinguished four e¤ects of feedback: the con…dence in manager e¤ect, the playing the odds e¤ect, the productivity e¤ect, and the self-con…dence e¤ect. If 0 < < 1, potentially these four e¤ects may simultaneously play a role.
This illustrates that the e¤ects of feedback may be quite complex.
We start the analysis by showing that if 0 < < 1, feedback only matters in case the worker is uncertain about the manager's type. That is, we prove the following proposition Proposition 3 Suppose that in the feedback model 0 < < 1 and 2 f0; 1g. Then, the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which:
(ii) the worker's e¤ort is given by (1); (iii) the posteriors are equal to their priors.
First, suppose that the worker knows that the manager does not possess private information about his ability, = 0. Then, feedback does not contain information, and it is optimal for the worker to ignore it. Now suppose that = 1. Then, feedback does not provide information about the manager's ability, as the worker knows that the manager is able. The only e¤ect that remains is the self-con…dence e¤ect. The worker may infer information from feedback about his own ability. However, as shown in the previous subsection, if the self-con…dence e¤ect is the only e¤ect of feedback, the manager has an incentive to send m = h, irrespective of the worker's type. The main message of Proposition 3 is that informative feedback requires uncertainty about the manager's ability to assess the worker's ability and Having established equilibrium behavior for 2 f0; 1g ; Proposition 4 describes equilibrium behavior for 0 < < 1.
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Proposition 4 Consider the feedback model with 0 < < 1. Then, in any nonbabbling equilibrium such that e (s; m = l) 6 = e (s; m = h) for some s 2 fl; hg we have:
; Moreover, if b < 1, then g (l) = 0; (II) the worker's e¤ort is given by (1); (III)^ (s; h) >^ (s; l) 8s 2 fh; lg;
Proof. See the appendix. . In this case, the playing the odds e¤ect is canceled out. The production e¤ect and the self-con…dence e¤ect give incentives to a bad manager to provide positive feedback. The con…dence in manager e¤ect may temper these incentives, but never dominates them. Hence, for = . Together with the result that a good manager, facing a high ability worker, always provides positive feedback, our model is able to explain the widely observed leniency bias: in general, managers tend to provide positive feedback. For > 1 2 , bad managers are even more inclined to provide positive feedback as a result of the playing the odds e¤ect.
Only if high ability workers are rare (low ), bad managers may lean to negative feedback. In line with our result that bad managers are more inclined to provide positive evidence, Bol (2011) presents evidence that managers for whom it is more costly to assess employee's performances are more lenient.
Our model highlights the importance of the interplay of the worker's self-perception and his perception of the manager's ability to assess his performance correctly. Neg-ative feedback discourages a worker who thinks highly of himself. Such a worker would dismiss a manager who provides negative feedback as incompetent. Feedback that is consistent with the worker's self perception enhances the worker's con…dence in the manager's ability to assess his performance. As a result, in our model negative feedback may encourage a worker who has a low self-perception. In line with our result, several studies have found that the e¤ect of negative feedback on a worker's performance crucially depends on the manager's reputation for being able to assess the worker's performance correctly.
In our model, the manager can only send two messages. For this reason, our model cannot provide an explanation for the centrality bias. However, our model does suggest an explanation. It demonstrates that the e¤ects of feedback depend on a worker's perception of his manager's ability to assess his performance correctly.
A dumb manager anticipates this. He has an incentive to give feedback that is consistent with the worker's own perception. In a model with, say, three messages, a dumb manager may tend to give neutral feedback to avoid too large deviations between feedback and the worker's perception. Note that this explanation for the centrality bias requires that especially large inconsistencies between the manager's view and the worker's view on performance damage the manager's reputation for being able to assess the worker's performance correctly.
Conclusions
In many organizations, annual performance appraisals form the basis for the rewards employees get. In this paper, we have investigated how a manager's performance appraisal a¤ects an employee's future performance. A key feature of our model is that both the manager and the employee have a perception of the employee's past performance. We have derived a couple of results. First, we have shown that even though a performance appraisal is cheap-talk, it may contain information that is relevant for the employee. Second, for a wide range of parameters the manager tend to give positive appraisals. Third, on average, a positive appraisal motivates an employee more than a negative appraisal. Fourth, the e¤ect of appraisals on an employee's future performance depends on the employee's perception of the ability of the manager to assess his performance. Finally, our analysis suggests an explanation for the centrality bias. The driving force behind most of our results is that the manager wants to come across as a person who is able to assess the performance of the agent correctly. This gives incentives to good managers to separate themselves from bad managers by giving informative feedback.
As usual, the results of our paper are derived from a model that is based on many assumptions. We have made some of these assumptions to drive home our results in a simple way. For instance, we have assumed that the good manager observes the employee's performance, while the bad manager does not have a clue. Qualitatively, assuming that a good manager is better in assessing the employee's performance than a bad manager would have su¢ ced.
A more restrictive assumption is that the manager is assumed to reward the employee on the basis of his perceived performance. As always, this is a restrictive assumption in case the manager is the residual claimant. Essential for our results is that the relationship between performance and pay depends on the manager's ability to assess the employee's performance.
A limitation of our model is that it does not consider long working relationships between the manager and the employee. This probably would make it hard for a bad mamager to maintain a good reputation. The employee would gradually learn the manager's type. As we have shown that performance appraisals only matter when the employee is uncertain about the manager's type, we expect that in a multi-period model the e¤ects of performance appraisals diminish over time. 
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
We prove each part of Proposition 4 in turn. For the proof of Part (I) we need several lemma's.
Lemmas for Part (I): First we point out that our assumption of a natural language -which we assume throughout the paper -implies g (l) g (h) : Then we show that it is better for the manager to match the worker's private signal with her feedback than to give the other feedback message. To do that we need to derive the preference relations of the manager over the feedback messages, given how the worker responds to each combination of private signal and feedback. These preference relations are then also used in the two next lemmas which prove the relationships between b and respectively g (h) and g (l) : Finally we observe that b > 0; which is the …nal Lemma necessary for the proof.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium we have g (l)
g (h) :
Proof. By our assumption of a natural language we have^ (s; h) ^ (s; l) for all s 2 fh; lg : We will show that^ (s; h) ^ (s; l) implies g (h) g (l).
^ (h; l) implies, after cross-multiplications of the denominators and simpli…cation,
and the result follows for s = h. The same steps will prove that^ (l; h) ^ (l; l)
We now turn to the question whether a manager wants to match the private signal of the worker.
Lemma 2 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6 = e (s; h) for some s 2 fh; lg ; then (e (l; l) e (l; h)) > 0 , (e (h; h) e (h; l)) > 0 and (e (l; l) e (l; h)) < 0 , (e (h; h) e (h; l)) < 0:
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose not. Then without loss of generality there exist k; k 0 2 fh; lg ; with k 6 = k 0 ; such that
By e (s 00 ; l) 6 = e (s 00 ; h) for some s 00 2 fh; lg at least one of these inequalities is strict.
That implies that with positive probability m = k 0 is strictly better than m = k;
while m = k 0 can never lead to a worse result. Thus any manager would strictly prefer m = k 0 to m = k and we have a babbling equilibrium: a contradiction.
Before we can proceed with the next lemma we need to derive the preference relations over the feedback messages by the managers, given e (s; m), s; m 2 fl; hg :
Given the feedback strategies anticipated by the worker, b and g (a), we …rst consider the conditions for which a manager is willing to send m = l: Note that = Pr (s = h) ; = Pr (a = h j s = h) = Pr (s = h j a = h) and = Pr (a = l j s = l) = Pr (s = l j a = l) : The bad manager is willing to send m = l only if 
Similarly, if a = h; a good manager is willing send m = l only if
For a = l; a good manager facing a low ability worker is willing to send m = l only if:
(e (l; l) e (l; h)) (1 ) (e (h; h) e (h; l))
The bad manager is willing to adopt a mixed strategy if and only if (6) holds with equality. If (6) is violated, the bad manager strictly prefers to send m = h: The same applies for a good manager with respect to (7) if a = h and with respect to
We can now show that a worker will put in more e¤ort if the feedback message matches his private signal.
Lemma 3 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6 = e (s; h) for some s 2 fh; lg : Then (e (l; l) e (l; h)) > 0:
Proof. Suppose not. Then by Lemma 2 (e (l; l) e (l; h)) < 0 and thus (e (h; h) e (h; l)) < 0: As (1 ) < we obtain that g (l) < 1 implies g (h) = 0.
By Lemma 1 this implies that g (l) = g (h) and g (h) 2 f0; 1g : It follows that g (h) = b ; as the worker would believe that the manager is bad, whenever he observes a message which cannot be observed from a good manager. This would constitute a babbling equilibrium: a contradiction.
This enables us to prove the …nal three lemmas which together will prove Part (I).
Lemma 4 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6 = e (s; h) for some s 2 fh; lg :
Proof. Here we show, by contradiction that the good manager facing a high ability worker will strictly prefer m = h if the bad manager is willing to send message m = h. Suppose not. Then (6) either holds with equality or is violated while (7) holds. By Lemma 3 this implies that
(e (h; h) e (h; l)) (e (l; l) e (l; h)) ; and 1 (e (h; h) e (h; l)) (e (l; l) e (l; h)) :
Combining yields
Note that
which gives us
(1 ) l 0
By < 1 and ; l > 0 this cannot hold. Thus, if b > 0; then g (h) = 1:
In a similar way, the following lemma can be derived.
Lemma 5 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6 = e (s; h) for some s 2 fh; lg : Then b < 1 implies g (l) = 0:
Proof. Suppose not. Then (6) holds while (8) is either violated or satis…ed with equality. Thus 1 (e (h; h) e (h; l)) (e (l; l) e (l; h))
(1 ) E (ajs = l) E (ajs = h) E (ajs = h)
(1 ) E (ajs = l) (1 ) (l + ( + (1 ) ) (h l)) ( + (1 ) (1 )) (1 ) (l + (1 ) (h l)) (1 ) h 0 By ; ; l > 0 this cannot hold, which proves the lemma. Now we only need to prove that b is strictly positive, and the results will follow.
Lemma 6 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6 = e (s; h) for some Now we can rewrite^ l; l; g (a) ; b ^ h; h; g (a) ; b 0 as: This concludes the proof.
